From Values to Economic Myths

Interview by Abel Hernández, published at Sintetia on September 24 (first part) and 26 (second part), 2012

Benito Arruñada is Professor of Business Organization at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. His research is at the borders of Organization, Economics and Law. He has published a large number of books and scientific articles, and his most recent …

Retiring before We Work

Arruñada, Benito (2010), “Retiring before We Work”, Expansión, February 22, p. 46.

The Spanish public has recently received two items of news: we shall live longer, but retire later. The two announcements are connected because we shall have to work longer to finance, amongst other things, the health care expenditure that will help us live longer.

Because of this …

Organizations or Markets in Morality?

Moral codes can be produced and enforced through markets or through organizations. In particular, Catholic theology can be interpreted as a paradigm of the organizational production of morality. In contrast, the dominant moral codes are now produced in something resembling more a market.

The organizational character of Catholicism comes from its centralized production and enforcement of the moral code by …

Is the Future in Contract Manufacturing?

The purchase of Opel by Magna shows the strength of contract manufacturers and their strategies, which I discussed with Xosé H. Vázquez in our 2006 article in the Harvard Business Review. Once thought of as a lifebelt for the decreasing margins of large-brand owners, contract manufacturing has now become a major source of competition. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), …

Does Economics Hinder Managers’ Ability?

In a paper with Xosé H. Vázquez we explore the consequences of using different behavioral assumptions in training managers on their future performance. We argue that training with an emphasis on the standard assumptions used in economics (rationality and self-interest) leads future managers to rely excessively on rational and explicit safeguarding, crowding out instinctive contractual heuristics and signaling a “bad” …